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Immoral Legislation and Tax Benefits
for Expat Corporations
JENNIFER KARR
Corporate tax inversions are a growing tax avoidance trend. In a corporate tax
inversion, an American corporation changes residence from the United States to a
foreign jurisdiction, generally without much or any change in its business operations,
in order to avoid paying U.S. taxes. Many industrialized countries, such as the U.K.
and Ireland, now offer much lower corporate tax rates than the U.S., and have become
popular destinations.
Traditionally, spectators have attempted to evaluate the morality of corporate
decisions. In some ways, this makes sense, given recent Supreme Court cases such as
Hobby Lobby and Citizens United, which have pushed corporations further toward
personhood. At the same time, corporations are supposed to act in the best interest of
shareholders, whether or not their actions are moral. For this reason, this Note
ignores the moral nature of a corporation’s decision to invert, and instead assesses the
U.S. laws which permit such inversions. Laws are analyzed through the lens of the
three main theories of morality—deontology, utilitarianism, and Aristotlean virtue—as
well as corporate social responsibility.
In determining that corporate tax inversions not only have a negative impact on
U.S. small businesses and general taxpayers, but often host countries as well, this Note
offers four workable solutions. First, Congress should pass the Stop Corporate
Inversions Act, which buffs the already active Internal Revenue Code § 7874. Second,
the Internal Revenue Service should issue regulations in the spirit of Internal Revenue
Code § 367 that will provide better guidelines for corporations that wish to move
abroad. Third, the definition of “corporate residence” should be altered to include
corporations with U.S. management. Fourth, intellectual property should be included
in Subpart F. Finally, when passing legislation regarding corporate inversions,
Congress must ask certain questions based in the three theories of morality in order to
pass more moral laws. A moral body of laws will help to lessen the tax burden shifted
to small businesses and general taxpayers by corporate tax avoidance. At the same
time, a moral body of laws should provide benefits to corporations which are truly
changing their place of residence for business purposes.
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Immoral Legislation and Tax Benefits
for Expat Corporations
JENNIFER KARR*
I. INTRODUCTION
Public opinion tends not to favor corporations.1 The IRS has not
garnered high public opinion either, with only a fifty-eight percent
approval rating, according to a Gallup poll.2 In both cases, an essential
unfairness lies at the heart of individual taxpayers’ dissatisfaction.3 That’s
not surprising when, “in 1953 families and individuals paid 59 per cent of
federal revenues and corporations 41 per cent . . . this ratio has now shifted
to approximately 80:20 in favour of corporations.”4
According to recent estimates, “the US federal authorities lose some
$170 billion annually to corporate tax avoidance.”5 Senator Bernie Sanders
compiled a list of the top ten most egregious corporate tax avoiders, with
some corporations’ tax rates being in the negative.6 Corporate inversions

*
University of Connecticut School of Law, J.D., 2016; University of Central Florida, M.F.A.
Creative Writing, 2013. I would like to thank Professor Stephen Utz, for thoughtful discussions and
feedback in researching and writing this Note. I would also like to thank my colleagues on the
Connecticut Law Review for their helpful editing.
1
See, e.g., Julia Battilana, Multinational Corporations Under Fire From Public Opinion
Campaigns, http://people.hbs.edu/jbattilana/ENGMay16.pdf (2011) [https://perma.cc/SJT6-UZXA]
(discussing protest movements against multinational corporations); Frank Newport, Americans
Similarly Dissatisfied with Corporations, Government, GALLUP (Jan. 17, 2013),
http://www.gallup.com/poll/159875/americans-similarly-dissatisfied-corporations-gov.aspx
(last
visited Feb. 21, 2016) [https://perma.cc/JG6B-2TVD] (discussing Americans’ dissatisfaction with the
influence of large corporations on the government).
2
Jeffrey M. Jones & Lydia Saad, Americans Sour on IRS, Rate CDC and FBI Most Positively,
GALLUP (May 23, 2013), http://www.gallup.com/poll/162764/americans-views-irs-sharply-negative2009.aspx (last visited Feb. 21, 2016) [https://perma.cc/JSE4-6LY8].
3
See, e.g., Robert W. Wood, Hate the IRS? You’ll Love These Laws, FORBES (Aug. 3, 2013),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/robertwood/2013/08/03/hate-the-irs-youll-love-these-laws/ (last visited
Feb. 21, 2016) [https://perma.cc/NQ9W-N5TT] (detailing several scandals involving the IRS, including
Lois Lerner’s targeting of one political group over others and IRS seizures not complying with the
law).
4
John Christensen & Richard Murphy, The Social Irresponsibility of Corporate Tax Avoidance:
Taking CSR to the Bottom Line, 47 DEVELOPMENT 37, 38–39 (2004) [hereinafter Social
Irresponsibility].
5
Id. at 38.
6
Bernie Sanders, Top 10 Corporate Tax Avoiders, BERNIE SANDERS: UNITED STATES SENATOR
FOR VERMONT, http://www.sanders.senate.gov/top-10-corporate-tax-avoiders (last visited Apr. 12,
2016) [https://perma.cc/M4RQ-M38M].
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are an increasingly popular form of corporate tax avoidance. In possibly
its simplest description, a corporate inversion is a “transaction[] in which a
U.S.-based company changes its place of incorporation from the United
States to a foreign jurisdiction, often without an accompanying change in
its business operations . . . primarily to reduce U.S. taxation of foreign and
even domestic income.”8
Frequent criticisms of corporate inversions tend to involve assessing
the morality (or lack thereof) of corporations engaging in the practice.9
They have been described by opponents as:
7

immoral, wrong, contemptible, the most blatant example of
abusive corporate tax shelters that increasingly plague our
country, outrageous, an unpatriotic tax dodge, a pure tax
avoidance mechanism that is very bad public policy, a stealth
weapon used by management to evade corporate
accountability, disgusting, rotten, reprehensible behavior,
awful, one of the ugliest issues that anybody has seen for a
while, a crisis that is reaching epidemic proportions,
troubling from a policy viewpoint, and a bad example of
corporate tax cheating.10
Even President Obama has used the term “unpatriotic tax loophole”
when referring to the allowance for inversions.11 While many debate the
morality of corporations taking advantage of legal tax “loopholes,” this
Note, rather, looks inward at the domestic laws which both create the, at
least perceived, need for inversions, and the ability for corporations to
engage in them. Assessing the morality of corporations essentially is
fruitless, as corporations are meant to act in the best interest of
shareholders.12 But democratic governments should act in ways that benefit

7
DONALD J. MARPLES & JANE G. GRAVELLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43568, CORPORATE
EXPATRIATION, INVERSIONS, AND MERGERS: TAX ISSUES (2015) 1–2 (discussing a “second wave” of
inversions).
8
Joseph A. Tootle, The Regulation of Corporate Inversions and “Substantial Business
Activities”, 33 VA. TAX REV. 353, 354 (2013).
9
See, e.g., Social Irresponsibility, supra note 4, at 39 (arguing that various types of corporate tax
avoidance are unethical); Susan H. Godar, Patricia J. O’Connor, & Virginia Anne Taylor, Evaluating
the Ethics of Inversion, 61 J. BUS. ETHICS 1 (2005) (finding corporate inversions to be unethical under
deontology and possibly utilitarianism as well) [hereinafter Ethics of Inversion].
10
Hale E. Sheppard, Fight or Flight of U.S.-Based Multinational Businesses: Analyzing the
Causes for, Effects of, and Solutions to the Corporate Inversion Trend, 23 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 551,
558 (2003) (internal quotation marks omitted) [hereinafter Fight or Flight].
11
Damian Paletta & Dana Mattioli, Double Punch for Inversion Deals, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 5, 2014
7:03 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-treasury-exploring-ways-to-deter-tax-inversions-withoutcongress-1407265800 [https://perma.cc/5LBY-RYPK].
12
See, e.g., August Jackson, Does a Corporation Owe Fiduciary Duty to Shareholders?, CHRON,
http://smallbusiness.chron.com/corporation-owe-fiduciary-duty-shareholders-70243.html [https://per

2016]

IMMORAL LEGISLATION AND TAX BENEFITS FOR EXPAT CORPORATIONS

1707

the people. For this reason, it is the legislation that permits corporations
to avoid taxes which should be assessed, rather than the corporations
themselves.
Understanding the moral nature of corporate inversion legislation
requires an analysis of the effects of said laws as well as the process by
which they come to fruition. Such analysis will shed light on the
problematic nature of the status quo and provide insight as to how
legislators can write more effective and beneficial laws.
Part II of this Note examines theories of morality and the history of
corporate inversions. The major theories—utilitarianism, deontology, and
Aristotlean Virtue—are used as explorative tools for breaking apart
corporate inversion regulation over the past twenty-five years. It is
important to note that, as it is the laws themselves which will be under a
microscope, a brief analysis of whether state actors can have a moral
component will be necessary; this question, for the most part, is answered
in the affirmative. These theories provide a way to better understand the
persisting problems with inversion legislation and provide guidance in
creating a more moral body of laws.
Part III discusses the problems in the current system. A large part of
why present legislation falls short is its piecemeal nature. One might
picture it as a sinking ship with a growing number of holes. Instead of
focusing on the big picture, legislators are focusing on slowly patching
each individual hole, as more and more come into being. Further, Congress
seems reluctant to fully commit to any specific type of regulation. This
lack of focus and commitment have led to large companies continuing to
move abroad, which is a loss in tax revenue for the U.S.
Part IV offers solutions for both creating more moral laws, and for
altering the current laws in ways that will best benefit the country. In a
theoretical sense, it would be beneficial for politicians to examine the
moral nature of legislation passed. Perhaps more pragmatically (and
realistically), however, there are several more concrete, workable solutions
which should help to lessen the rush to invert. Current corporate inversion
law should be buffed by the passage of legislation which was proposed in
2014. That legislation would strengthen § 7874. Congress should also alter
the definition of corporate residence and offer clear regulations for
corporations which truly want to move abroad. Finally, intellectual
property (IP) should no longer be excluded from Subpart F.
On one hand, these changes would make it more difficult for U.S.
13

ma.cc/57E6-UCHB] (discussing a corporation’s fiduciary duties to shareholders) (last visited Feb. 21,
2016).
13
What is Democracy?, LECTURE AT HILLA UNIVERSITY FOR HUMANISTIC STUDIES (2004),
https://web.stanford.edu/~ldiamond/iraq/whaisdemocracy012004.htm (last visited Feb 14, 2016)
[https://perma.cc/67PM-5VRX].
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corporations to invert. On the other hand, they would make it easier for
truly international corporations to change their place of corporate
residence. As will be explored further in this Note, some proposed
solutions are simply not workable—for example lowering the corporate tax
rate in order to compete with European countries would likely lead to an
unsustainable burden on small businesses and individual taxpayers. There
must be clear guidelines for corporations wishing to change their corporate
residence, and these residency changes ought to be evaluated on a case-bycase basis.
Finally, Part V concludes this Note.
II. THE CORPORATION, THE INVERSION, AND MORALITY
A. Evolution of the Modern Corporation
Summarizing the evolution of the modern corporation can lend some
insight as to why our laws exist as they do today. While modern
corporations are seen as for-profit businesses, prior to the nineteenth
century they were actually “formed chiefly for political or charitable
purposes.”14 At the beginning of United States history, state legislatures
chose participants and terms for corporations, which were established by
the state issuing special acts.15 These state-created corporations formed “in
order to address public needs, such as transportation or infrastructure.”16
Because of public displeasure and the burden placed on the legislative
system, incorporation became available to everyone in the early nineteenth
century—though each state government had to create its own incorporation
statutes.17
In the twentieth century, incorporation statutes moved further and
further away from government regulation.18 New Jersey was the first state
to allow corporations to hold stock in other corporations, making many
modern corporate structures possible.19 The states also permitted
corporations to: exist perpetually, organize for any (lawful) purpose except
banking, amend certificates of incorporation, own stock in other
corporations, own unlimited land, and merge with other corporations.20
Beginning in the late nineteenth century, states “race[d]” to deregulate.21
Deregulation meant attracting more corporations to the state, bringing
14
WILLIAM T. ALLEN ET AL., COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS
ORGANIZATION 90 (4th ed. 2012).
15
Id. at 90.
16
Id. at 91.
17
Id.
18
Id. 92.
19
Id.
20
Id. at 92–93.
21
Id. 93.
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business as well as corporation franchise fees to the state. In more recent
history, however, the judiciary and federal securities laws have imposed
some regulations on public corporations, in the “flavor of early corporation
law.”23 Yet, with Delaware as the most popular state for incorporation, the
Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL) is a “nonregulatory, enabling
statute with few mandatory features.”24
Notably, since corporations now have a history of being designed by
the states, with federal commissions playing a regulatory part, a tension
between federal and state governments may reduce the ability of the
federal government to act morally when lawmakers feel they must defer to
the states.
22

B. The United States’ System
While some countries employ a territorial system of taxation,25 the
United States imposes a worldwide system.26 In some cases, this results in
double taxation because corporations are taxed on: (1) domestic income
and (2) foreign income.27 To avoid double taxation, the United States
issues limited foreign tax credits equal to the amount of taxes the
corporation paid on their foreign income.28
Further, the U.S. is a liberal market economy, which emphasizes
“arm’s length relationships and public trading.”29 A feature of the liberal
market economy is its flexible regulatory structure, which “benefits
industries targeting low costs and those operating in sectors characterized
by radical innovation.”30 Liberal market economies best fit within the
Id.
Id. at 94.
24
Id. at 93 (internal quotation marks omitted).
25
See Tootle, supra note 8, at 357 (“Under a territorial system, a nation taxes only income from
sources within its boundaries.”).
26
See id. at 356 (describing the United States’ worldwide system of taxation).
27
See id. (“Under a worldwide system, a nation taxes both the domestic income of its citizens and
residents, and the income of its citizens and residents that is earned in foreign nations.”); Fight or
Flight, supra note 10, at 552–53 (“U.S. tax applies to income earned by the foreign corporation that is
‘effectively connected’ with the ‘conduct of a trade or business’ within the United States. In addition, a
foreign corporation is generally subject to a thirty percent tax when it receives certain passive income
derived from sources within the United States.”).
28
See Tootle, supra note 8, at 356 (“[T]he United States uses a system of foreign tax credits
[which] . . . reduces a citizen’s or resident’s U.S. income tax liability by the amount of foreign income
taxes paid on foreign source income.”).
29
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Corporate Taxation and Corporate Social Responsibility, 11 N.Y.U. J.
LAW & BUS. 1, 17 (2009) [hereinafter Taxation]. Other nations can be corporatist, like Germany and
Japan, relying on “tightly integrated private and networked associations to resolve significant dilemmas
of economic integration,” or statist, like France, “depend[ing] on hierarchical solutions in resolving
coordination problems.” Id. at 16.
30
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Corporate Social Responsibility and Strategic Tax Behavior, 6 (John M.
Olin Ctr. for Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 69, 2006) at 10 [hereinafter Strategic Tax Behavior].
22
23
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aggregate or “nexus of contracts” view of the corporation. Proponents of
the aggregate view argue that the corporation is “an aggregate of its
members or shareholders” (as opposed to a “creature of the state” under the
artificial entity theory, or a “separate entity controlled by its managers”
under the real entity theory).32 The implications of subscribing to the
aggregate view will be discussed, infra.
31

C. From the First Corporate Tax Inversion to the Modern Inversion
While there are several different models of corporate inversions,33 the
first known inversion occurred in 1983 by McDermott, Inc.34 McDermott
had a wholly-owned Panamanian subsidiary.35 That subsidiary issued to
McDermott shareholders an amount of common stock equal to ninety
percent of its voting power.36 In exchange, the Panamanian subsidiary
received about sixty-eight percent of the stock of its parent company.37 In
effect, McDermott became an international corporation through its
Panamanian subsidiary, but the American shareholders held most of the
power over the company.
After the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) unsuccessfully challenged the
McDermott inversion, Congress enacted Section 1248(i)38 of the Internal
Revenue Code (“IRC” or “the Code”).39 Essentially, Section 1248(i) treats
an exchange of stock between domestic shareholders of a foreign
corporation and the foreign corporation as a dividend.40 So, in an exchange
like McDermott’s, the shares should be treated as though they had first
31
See Taxation, supra note 29, at 12, 17 (“The liberal model . . . best fits the aggregate theory of
the firm.”).
32
Id. at 12, 15.
33
In stock transactions, “the shareholders of a U.S. corporation exchange their shares for stock in
a foreign corporation.” Tootle, supra note 8, at 363. Reincorporations, or asset transactions, involve a
U.S. corporation merging with its foreign parent, and the foreign parent surviving. Id. In a drop-down
transaction, “the U.S. corporation transfers its assets to the foreign parent through a reincorporation and
the foreign parent immediately contributes some of those assets to a newly formed U.S. subsidiary.” Id.
A spin-off involves a multinational creating a foreign subsidiary “to which is contributes the business it
desires to divest.” Id. at 364.
34
See id. at 364 (discussing the McDermott transaction). This first corporate inversion was
structured as a stock transaction. Id. at 364–65. Notably, the McDermott inversion has lagged the S&P
eighty-five percent since their inversion was completed. Kevin Drawbaugh, “Inversions” Don’t Always
Benefit Investors, WASH. POST., Aug. 19, 2014, at A09.
35
See Peter Canellos, Acquisition of Issuer Securities by a Controlled Entity: Peter Pan Seafoods,
May Department Stores, and McDermott, 45 TAX LAWYER 1, 10 (1991) (discussing McDermott’s
transaction with its Panamanian subsidiary).
36
Id. at 10.
37
Id.
38
26 U.S.C. § 1248(i) (2012).
39
See Tootle, supra note 8, at 365 (“Although the Service was unsuccessful in its challenge
[against McDermott], the transaction prompted Congress to enact Section 1248(i) of the Code.”).
40
26 U.S.C. § 1248(i) (2012).
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been issued to the domestic McDermott corporation, and then distributed to
shareholders as dividends.41 The result would be taxation on the dividends.
Following the enactment of Section 1248(i), in 1989, Congress enacted
Section 163(j),42 which was “designed to deter interest stripping
transactions.”43 However, since it only applies to corporations with debt to
equity ratios of 1.5 to 1 or more, “it is generally accepted that the provision
does not deter interest stripping transactions.”44
After a second corporation inverted in 1994, the IRS “issued new
regulations under Section 367(a)45 of the Code that made transfers of stock
of domestic corporations to foreign corporations taxable if, in the
aggregate, all U.S. transferors owned 50% or more of the stock of the
foreign parent by vote or by value immediately after the exchange.” 46
Under Section 367(a), transfers of stock from a U.S. corporation to a
foreign corporation are taxable.47
Inversions resurfaced with gusto in the late 1990s and early 2000s.48
Within the American Jobs Creation Act of 200449 lies Section 787450 of the
IRC. Section 7874 applies to “corporate inversions after which a certain
percentage of former shareholders of the U.S. company own stock in the
foreign parent company, or the ‘surrogate foreign corporation’ in the
statute’s language.”51
There are two main provisions in Section 7874.52 First, if shareholders
who originally held stock in the domestic corporation, or former corporate
partners who owned capital or profit interest in the domestic corporation,
41
Canellos, supra note 35, at 10–11 (explaining how Section 1248(i) would apply to an inversion
like McDermott’s).
42
26 U.S.C. § 163j (2012).
43
Tootle, supra note 8, at 365. In an interest stripping transaction, either the new foreign parent or
another related party extends a loan to the U.S. operating company. The U.S. operating company then
pays what is nominal “interest” to its parent and deducts the amount paid from its U.S. source taxable
income. Ordinarily, the foreign parent is obligated to pay the 30% U.S. withholding tax on the interest
it receives from the U.S. operating company. Through careful use of international tax treaties, however,
the U.S. tax liability on the interest paid to the foreign parent may be greatly reduced or altogether
avoided. Further, it is possible that under the foreign nation’s laws, the foreign parent corporation will
not be taxed on the interest received. Id. at 361–62.
44
Id. at 366.
45
26 U.S.C. § 367(a).
46
Tootle, supra note 8, at 366.
47
26 U.S.C. § 367(a).
48
Tootle, supra note 8, at 366–67 (“Despite [the regulations’] effect, more large corporations
inverted during the latter half of the 1990s, including Triton Energy, Tyco, Fruit of the Loom, Gold
Reserve Corporation, Transocean, and White Mountain Insurance Group. The economic downturn of
the early 2000s reduced the impact of the section 367(a) regulations . . . which may have prompted
more inversions.”).
49
American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, 118 Stat. 1418.
50
26 U.S.C. § 7874 (2012).
51
Tootle, supra note 8, at 368.
52
26 U.S.C. § 7874(a)(2) (2012).
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own sixty percent of the stock in the foreign corporation, the foreign
corporation is considered a surrogate foreign corporation.53 Second, if
either of the same groups of people own eighty percent of the foreign
company’s stock, then the foreign company is treated as a domestic
corporation.54 However, there is an exception. In both of these cases, the
foreign corporations are not considered foreign surrogates or domestic
corporations if they have “substantial business activity” in the foreign
country.55 Because of the “substantial business activity” rule, and because
previously popular inversion countries (like the Cayman Islands and
Bermuda) do not have a lot of economic activity, countries like Ireland,
Switzerland, and the UK are now popular destinations.56
In a sixty-percent inversion, the yearly taxable gain cannot be less than
the inversion gain.57 “Inversion gains include any gain on property or stock
transferred to the foreign parent, and any licensing income on that
property, without offset for losses or credits other than the foreign tax
credit.”58 Otherwise, these inversions are not “pure” inversions and are
treated “leniently.”59
Section 7874 hasn’t been entirely prohibitive, as corporations can
simply keep their corporate structure as is while reinvesting revenue
overseas, which allows for indefinite deferral on tax payments.60 Further,
multinational corporations have shifted about seventy-five billion dollars
out of the country by “investing in active sectors like Ireland
manufacturing.”61
Finally, according to Tyler Dumler, Section 7874 may only have
diverted some possible inversions to other tax avoidance tactics:
[Multi-national corporations] are now eroding the U.S. tax
revenue base through alternative methods. Such methods
include: income trapping using indefinite deferrals of active
income in foreign countries; repatriation of excessive foreign
tax credits; avoidance of taxation on holding companies in
low-tax jurisdictions using “check the box” regulations and
hybrid entities; continuing to increase debt shares in high-tax
26 U.S.C. § 7874(a)(2)(B)(ii)(I).
26 U.S.C. § 7874(b).
55
26 U.S.C. § 7874(a)(2)(B)(iii).
56
MARPLES & GRAVELLE, supra note 7, at 6 (discussing how the business activity exemption has
caused some corporations to invert in European countries).
57
26 U.S.C. § 7874(a)(1).
58
Tootle, supra note 8, at 369.
59
Id. at 369–70.
60
Tyler M. Dumler, Charging Less to Make More: The Causes and Effects of the Corporate
Inversion Trend in the U.S. and the Implications of Lowering the Corporate Tax Rate, 13 U.C. DAVIS
BUS. L.J. 89, 89 (2012).
61
Id. at 89–90.
53
54
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jurisdictions to take advantage of applicable interest credits;
and related tax planning behavior.62
Current Congressional considerations will be discussed, infra. Now
that the current status of inversions and corporate inversion law has been
discussed, an exploration of moral theories will show how our laws should
be evaluated.
D. Basics of Morality
For the purposes of this note, I focus the discussion mainly on
utilitarianism and Kant’s deontological theory, while also touching on
Aristotelian virtue.63 A discussion of whether or not these theories of
morality and ethics are truly applicable to state actors will be reserved for
later in the Note.64
1. Utilitarianism
Utilitarianism describes a set of consequentialist theories;
consequentialism describes moral theories where normative properties
depend only on consequences, whereas utilitarian theories focus on
aggregate welfare.65 Under utilitarianism, “[o]ur basic ethical concern is to
bring it about, so far as we can, that there is more welfare or utility in the
world rather than less, and, in the simplest version of utilitarianism, we
should simply act in the most efficient way to bring that about.”66 Because
utilitarianism is a type of consequentialism,67 the moral goodness of an act
depends not on the actor’s motives or intentions, but on the outcome, or
consequence, of her action.68 So, for example, if an actor knew that killing
one person would save one hundred other people, under a utilitarian moral
theory that killing would likely be considered morally just.
To be clear, though utilitarianism is a form of consequentialism, the
two are not synonymous. Consequentialists believe that, by any means, an
Id. at 94–95.
These are the three theories that generally influence public policy debates. STEPHEN UTZ, TAX
POLICY: AN INTRODUCTION AND SURVEY OF THE PRINCIPAL DEBATES 35 (1993) [hereinafter TAX
POLICY]. For a more in depth discussion of these theories, see, for example, Stephen Utz, Chapter
Three: How Taxes Affect People’s Welfare, in TAX POLICY: AN INTRODUCTION AND SURVEY OF THE
PRINCIPAL DEBATES (1993); Bernard Williams, Chapter Three: Foundations: Well-Being, in ETHICS
AND THE LIMITS OF PHILOSOPHY; Bernard Williams, Chapter Five: Styles of Ethical Theory, in ETHICS
AND THE LIMITS OF PHILOSOPHY (1985).
64
See infra Part II.E.
65
See WILLIAMS, supra note 64, at 75 (“All the variants [of ultilitarians] agree on aggregating
welfare, that is to say, adding together in some way the welfare of all the individuals involved.”).
66
Id. at 77.
67
Id. at 35–36 (referring to utilitarianism as a type of “welfarist consequentialism”).
68
See TAX POLICY, supra note 63, at 35 (“Consequentialism is the view that in evaluating
alternative courses of conduct as good or bad, not with respect to other goals but as such, we need only
consider the consequences of the available choices.”).
62
63
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end that produces good is morally good (but there is disagreement about
how to determine which consequences are “good” and which are “bad”).69
Utilitarians care about producing the greatest amount of pleasure (mental
pleasure, specifically, according to John Stuart Mill) for the greatest
amount of people.70
Mill emphasized mental pleasure as utility, and therefore mental
pleasures as uniquely valuable.71 In his Principles of Political Economy, he
argues that, in matters of taxation, “whatever sacrifices [the government]
requires from [persons or classes] should be made to bear as nearly as
possible with the same pressure upon all, which, it must be observed, is the
mode by which least sacrifice is occasioned on the whole.”72 Further, he
argued, “[e]quality of taxation . . . means equality of sacrifice.”73 This,
however, poses further questions. What exactly does “equality of sacrifice”
entail? Surely a middle class person paying a fifteen percent marginal tax
rate still bears more of a relative burden than a billionaire paying a tax rate
as high as even ninety percent. A much more in depth discussion of this
particular point is beyond the scope of this note, but the question should be
considered when discussing possible legislative changes.
A problem with evaluating actions from a utilitarian moral theory is
that the ultimate consequences of an action may not be clear for some
time.74 As an extreme example, consider a person with a time machine. She
utilizes the time machine to return to early twentieth century Germany and
kills Hitler. By doing this, she saves the lives of more than six million
people. While it seems like the death of one has clearly produced the
greatest amount of happiness by saving the lives of so many others, what
if, as a result of the Holocaust not happening, an even more expansive
genocide takes place in the future? This very problem is more than evident
in recent anti-inversion legislation. While lawmakers may (or may not)
believe they are creating laws that will benefit the greatest amount of
people, they may actually be harming more than they are helping. For
example, consider a raise in the corporate tax for the purpose of funding
more social programs. Suppose that, at first, the extra revenue does, in fact,
fulfill this purpose. But suppose then, that corporations find ways to shelter
69
See Corey A. Ciochetti, Tricky Business: A Decision-Making Framework for Legally Sound,
Ethically Suspect Business Tactics, 12 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 1, 9 (2013) (“[T]he
means . . . to obtain [an] end are morally irrelevant as long as good is produced.”).
70
See id. at 11 (“To Mill, good actions were those that produce the greatest mental pleasure
(happiness or well-being) and bad actions are those that tend to produce mental pain (unhappiness).”).
71
See JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 42, 445 (1848) (discussing
value, nature, and scarcity).
72
Id. at 804.
73
Id.
74
See Ciochetti, supra note 69, at 12 (“[T]he consequences of an action are not always clear and
it is exceptionally difficult to understand how these uncertain consequences will help or harm other
people.”).
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their money, resulting in an actual reduction of overall revenue collected,
and new social programs that can no longer be sustained. Though the
lawmakers might have had pure intentions, their action resulting in a
negative consequence cannot be considered moral from a utilitarian
viewpoint.
Notably, business ethics professor Corey A. Ciochetti writes,
“evaluating the greatest good for the greatest number of people is a time
consuming process. Many moral decisions require a much faster answer.”75
Time is an interesting factor when applied to state actors who have much
greater resources than the average person and who act at a different pace
entirely than the average person.
2. Deontology
Conversely, while deontology does take consequences into account,
the real focus of an act’s moral nature lies in the actor’s intention or
motivation.76 According to Kant, “[n]othing in the world—indeed nothing
even beyond the world—can possibly be conceived which could be called
good without qualification except a good will.”77 So, if an actor’s intent in
killing someone is nothing other than to take their life, then the act would
most likely not be considered moral under a deontological view, even if the
unintended consequence is to save the lives of others. Think of deontology
as choosing the “right” thing to do instead of the “good” thing to do.78
That’s all fine when applied to individuals, but questions arise when
applying deontology to governments (especially democratic governments).
Under Kant’s theory of deontology, an action is only moral if both the
action and the reason for the action “can be willed as universal law.”79
Ciochetti identifies three steps in determining whether an action is moral
under Kantian theory: (1) “define a . . . statement[] that states your reason
for acting as you propose;” (2) ask “can this decision be universalized?”;
(3) ask “would you want to live in such a world?”80 So, under a Kantian
view of morality, it would be imperative to know the reason for the
government’s action, to consider whether such laws can be universalized,
and to determine whether such a world would be beneficial. The high
probability that corporate inversions are deontologically immoral is

Id.
TAX POLICY, supra note 63, at 37 (“The essential feature of deontological ethical theories is
their insistence on the role of intention or motivation in giving value to actions and, derivatively, to the
consequences of action.”).
77
IMMANUEL KANT, FOUNDATIONS IN THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 393 (1785).
78
Ciochetti, supra note 69, at 13 (“[E]mphasis is on the ‘right thing to do’ rather than the ‘good
thing to do.’”).
79
Ethics of Inversion, supra note 9, at 3.
80
Ciochetti, supra note 69, at 15–16.
75
76
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obvious.
But, with the (arguably optimistic) understanding that
corporations govern themselves to benefit shareholders and the U.S.
government exists only by and for the people, surely corporations and
governments ought to have different, even competing, motivations.
“Kant argued that people have the capacity to act out of [a] sense of
duty because people have the ability to reason.”82 Can governments
reason? Certainly, governments are made up of people, who presumably
have the ability to reason. And each legislator in a democratic government
is elected by a majority of her constituents, who also have the ability to
reason. But laws are not made by single representatives, which leaves us
with the question: can a large group of lawmakers be considered in the
same light as an individual? This question will be discussed infra.
81

3. Virtue
To evaluate one’s morality from Aristotle’s virtue-based perspective,
one must evaluate the actor as a whole. The consequences of an actor’s
actions and the intentions of any one given act are less important than an
individual’s whole moral past.83 So, if an actor who has generally acted
with bad will and to negative consequences commits a good act, that act
will not be considered as good as if an actor who has generally acted with
good will and to positive consequences commits the same act.84 Put more
eloquently, “[f]or Aristotle . . . practical reason required the dispositions of
action and feeling to be harmonized; if any disposition was properly to
count as a virtue, it had to be part of a rational structure that included all
the virtues.”85
Unlike utilitarianism and deontology, Aristotlean virtue does not base
itself on any given act. Put succinctly, while a utilitarian might ask, “What
was the outcome of his action?” and a deontologist might ask, “What was
the motivation for her action?,” under the virtue-based theory, one might
ask, “Is he living his life with the goal of being a good person?”86 A
virtuous person is one with good character.87
But applying virtue to states is problematic when one considers this
definition of virtue: “an acquired human quality the possession and
exercise of which tends to enable us to achieve those goods which are
81
Ethics of Inversion, supra note 9, at 3 (claiming that under Kantian deontology, corporate
inversions are immoral).
82
Ciochetti, supra note 69, at 14.
83
UTZ, supra note 63, at 38.
84
See id. (“Not only the moral habits of the agent, but the opportunities for forming them are
important in assessing how good the individual acts of this person are, and how good the person as a
whole is.”).
85
WILLIAMS, supra note 63, at 36.
86
Ciochetti, supra note 70, at 18–19.
87
See id. at 19 (“The key to [v]irtue [e]thics is the development of . . . a good character.”).
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internal to practices and the lack of which effectively prevents us from
achieving any such goods.”88 States are obviously, by definition, not
human. Suppose “human” was left out of the definition. Can states
“acquire” qualities? Certainly over time governments have changed—some
for the better and some for the worse. Given the advances in social justice
made since the inception of our nation, it would be easy to argue that the
United States has evolved for the better.
Yet, Aristotlean virtue is even harder to apply to states when one
considers that “for Aristotle virtue was an internalized disposition of
action, desire, and feeling . . . It involves the agent’s exercise of
judgment . . . [and] favorable and unfavorable reactions to other people,
their characters and actions.”89 Although Aristotle referred to the
individual, it is worth considering the implications of applying his theory
to governmental bodies. In any case, applying Aristotlean virtue to state
actors is challenging, in the least.
4. Corporate Social Responsibility
Worthy of note, though perhaps not incredibly helpful, is a critical
theory specific to corporations called Corporate Social Responsibility
(“CSR”). CSR theorists examine “the obligations and inclinations, if any,
of corporations organized for profit, voluntarily to pursue social ends that
conflict with the presumptive shareholder desire to maximize profit.”90 For
instance, in one CSR article, the writers reject the idea that there should be
no distinction between the legality and morality of corporate tax
avoidance.91 Interestingly, the writers of that same article conclude that, in
order to curb tax avoidance and other harmful tax practices, global
initiatives (not corporations themselves) must be utilized to create a
framework to “balance the need [of] sovereign states to protect their tax
revenues from aggressive tax avoidance, with a respect for the right of
democratic governments to determine a tax rate appropriate to their
circumstances.”92 Finally, the writers advocate for a worldwide, rather than

88
ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY 190–91 (2d ed., 1984).
Virtue ethics focus on a definition of character which is based upon a determined list of twelve good
attributes that fall into a golden mean between two vices (e.g., bravery is a virtue between the vices of
cowardice and foolhardiness). This list is not determined in any principled or analytical way. This
poses further questions when determining what values would comprise the character of a virtuous state.
Aristotle’s Ethics Table of Virtue and Vices, CENTRAL WASH. UNIV., http://www.cwu.edu/~warren/
unit1/aristotles_virtues_and_vices.htm (last visited Mar. 31, 2016) [https://perma.cc/Q5AX-X6HR].
89
WILLIAMS, supra note 63, at 35–36.
90
David L. Engel, An Approach to Corporate Social Responsibility, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1, 5–6
(1979).
91
See Social Irresponsibility, supra note 4, at 39 (“It is not possible to be ethical in one area of
business conduct and to act otherwise in another area.”).
92
Id. at 42.
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a territorial system.
But, while CSR theorists comment on the ethics and morality of
corporate actions and on possible solutions to problems, they stop short of
examining the morality and ethics of the laws themselves. Rather, it seems
that they view laws as tools, instead of things with innately measurable
morality. In fact, this is one of the criticisms in international tax expert
Reuven Avi-Yonah’s working paper, Corporate Social Responsibility and
Strategic Tax Behavior. Avi-Yonah points out the “illegitima[cy]” of CSR
under the aggregate view of the corporation.94 Continuing under the
aggregate view, he further argues, “if corporations are not permitted to
engage in CSR, then all social responsibility functions devolve on the
state . . . But if corporate managers are required to minimize tax payments
as much as possible, that could mean that the state is left without adequate
resources to fulfill its governmental function.”95 Notably, most European
Union governments utilize CSR programs.96
Given Avi-Yonah’s argument, if, as in a liberal market economy, the
United States adopts an aggregate view of the corporation, this creates a
catch-22. If the moral responsibility to perform all socially conscious
functions falls on the state, then it would follow that it is the state’s
responsibility to collect as much revenue as possible in order to fund social
programs. Yet, according to Avi-Yonah, the aggregate view leaves the
corporation with no moral responsibility to pay taxes not required by the
state.97 So, either CSR is illegitimate as a critical theory, or one-hundred
percent of the moral responsibility falls on the state. Avi-Yonah gives the
following example of an instance where it is only the state’s obligation to
remedy a crisis. In the event of a health crisis, corporations owe no
obligation to address it.98 However, the resources the state needs are funded
by taxes—many of which are collected from corporations.99 While AviYonah argues that, despite the aggregate view, the state “can expect the
corporation to contribute its fair share to the ability of the state to fulfill its
obligations,”100 what exactly “fair share” means or how to go about
adequately collecting it is much less obvious.
Perhaps the failings of CSR theories are highlighted most here. While
93

Id.
Strategic Tax Behavior, supra note 30, at 3–4, 19, 23.
95
Id. at 5.
96
See id. at 11 (“Practically every EU government (including even the UK) has programs
designed to foster CSR.”). See generally European Commission, Corporate Social Responsibility:
National Public Policy in the European Union (2004), http://www.ec.europa.eu/social/
BlobServlet?docId=2036&langId=en (last visited Feb. 16, 2016) [https://perma.cc/Y6ZJ-LV2Q].
97
See Strategic Tax Behavior, supra note 30, at 3–5.
98
Id. at 14–15.
99
Id. at 15.
100
Id.
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94
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the artificial entity and real entity views place responsibility on
corporations to act morally (or, at least, in a socially responsible way), the
aggregate view requires that corporations pay their fair share. 101
Furthermore, despite any of the CSR theories imposing moral obligation on
corporations, Learned Hand famously stated in Helvering v. Gregory,102
that there is “not even a patriotic duty” to pay more taxes than the
minimum required.103 Notably, in Gregory, Hand assessed a tax deficiency
against corporate tax evaders.104
However, Avi-Yonah provides this particularly illuminating point:
“[e]ven if from the perspective of management CSR is an illegitimate tax
on shareholders, the government could still legitimately try to encourage
corporations to engage in CSR by giving tax incentives.”105 In the next
subsection, this Note addresses the questions previously raised in the
utilitarian, deontology, and virtue sections: that is, whether a state can be a
moral actor.
E. Can States Act Morally?
Since the theories of morality introduced in this Note have mainly
concerned individuals, the question of whether states can act morally is
really a question of the legitimacy of applying said theories to states. If
determined that one in good conscious cannot apply any of the most
explored theories of morality to states, it begs the question: does any
responsibility on the state exist?
Let’s begin by considering one theory of what makes an actor moral:
“[w]hat gives the capacity to make decisions a moral cast is the ability of
the individual and external observers to evaluate the decision and its
consequences from a distinctly moral perspective.”106 There are really two
points to this inquiry. First, can the “individual” (the state in our case)
evaluate its own decisions and consequences from a moral perspective?
Second, can external observers evaluate the state’s decisions from a moral
perspective?
In response to the first pointed question, the U.S. government evaluates
its own laws in multiple ways. A law can be upheld or overturned by a
Supreme Court ruling.107 The president can make an executive order.108
Id. at 23.
69 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1934).
103
Id. at 810.
104
Id. at 811.
105
Strategic Tax Behavior, supra note 30, at 5.
106
DAVID C. THOMASMA & DAVID N. WEISSTUB, THE VARIABLES OF MORAL CAPACITY 10
(2004).
107
See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) (establishing judicial review).
108
U.S. CONST. art. 2, §§ 1, 3.
101
102

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

1720

[Vol. 48:1703

And Congress can create new laws to replace old ones that it feels are no
longer appropriate or just.109 But when the Supreme Court, Congress, or
the president make and overturn laws, are they doing so from a moral
perspective? In other words, when the Supreme Court chooses to uphold a
law, are they basing their decision in any part on utilitarianism, deontology,
Aristotlean virtue, or any other moral perspective?
Comments from justices post-decision could help determine whether or
not morality comes into play. For instance, after the famous Citizens
United110 ruling, Justice Ginsburg said that it is the one ruling she would
overturn if she could choose one, and that it “pave[s] the way for more
unfettered campaign spending by corporations.”111 In this comment, Justice
Ginsburg takes a utilitarian stance by considering the effects the decision
could have on future elections. In fact, given our standard of stare decisis,
perhaps all court decisions are utilitarian because each decision must look
to future effects. Conversely, stare decisis almost requires that justices only
evaluate and alter past decisions in the most extreme circumstances. So its
evaluation of laws can, most likely, be evaluated from a moral perspective.
At the same time, the moral determination of the Supreme Court’s ability
(or willingness, perhaps) to evaluate its own past decisions is hazier.
As to the question of external observers, given the wealth of articles
written about many of our laws, executive orders, and Supreme Court
decisions, this second prong appears to be much more easily met.
The idea of states acting morally (or immorally) is not a new one.
Machiavelli viewed states as potential moral actors.112 He even recognized
that states are made up of human leaders. For instance, in Discourses he
wrote, “[h]appy is that state which produces a man prudent enough to
provide it with laws and institutions by which it may live securely without
any need to alter them.”113 Machiavelli continued, “least happy of all is the
one whose institutions are entirely off the path that leads to a right and
perfect end.”114 He discusses government’s regard for civil rights.115
Further, he posited that “laws make men good.”116 Laws accomplish this

U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
111
Charlotte Alter, Ginsburg Says Citizens United Was Supreme Court’s Worst Ruling, TIME
(Sept. 29, 2014), http://time.com/3445010/ruth-bader-ginsburg-citizens-united/ (last visited Feb. 21,
2016) [https://perma.cc/FLJ6-F8E9].
112
See infra, notes 114–19 and accompanying text.
113
Niccolo Machiavelli, Discourses upon the First Ten Books of Titus Livy, in THE PRINCE 91
(Daniel Donno ed., Daniel Donno trans., Bantam Books 1981) (1513).
114
Id.
115
See id. at 93 (discussing a government ruled by aristocracy, which, he argues had no regard for
civic right.)
116
See id. at 96.
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feat by imposing morality on men. Particularly relevant to the discussion
of whether corporate inversion laws are moral or not is his assertion that
“all laws enacted to increase liberty derive from the conflict between [the
common people and the aristocrats].”118 In fact, Machiavelli’s The Prince,
while directed towards a “prince” or other national leader, is really directed
towards a state government.119 Like a nation governed by royalty, a
democratic nation is ruled by modern-day royals—of which are people
who can act morally or immorally.
Another argument for regarding states as moral actors is that, in the
contemporary global world, states can even assess and affect the morality
of other states. For example, “a state actor can draw attention to a violation
of a moral norm [and] make it a focus of international discussion and
action.”120
But what of Aristotlean virtue? While utilitarianism and deontology are
more easily applicable to states, is it possible to apply a virtue theory to a
state? To do so, one could look at a nation’s history and body of laws. By
doing this with the U.S., one could argue that the nation is not necessarily
moral because it has not always acted morally;121 yet it arguably has
become more moral over time.122 But a problem still exists. This note
contends that part of the reason nations can be moral (or immoral) is
because they are governed by humans.123 But, while the nation has its own
body of laws stretching back to its founding, the people who govern have
changed many times over. Although one can evaluate long-term outcomes
and even legislators’ intentions from a moral standpoint, perhaps it is
impossible to apply Aristotlean virtue when the human actors in charge
constantly change.
Overall, while some theorists might disagree, it does seem possible to
apply morality to states, at least in the sense of deontology, and certainly
utilitarianism. In the next section, having accepted states as moral actors
under the theories of utilitarianism and deontology, this Note applies these
theories to our body of corporate tax inversion laws.
117
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Id. (“Whoever organizes a state and establishes its laws must assume that all men are wicked
and will act wickedly whenever they have the chance to do so.”).
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Id.
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See generally NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE (Daniel Donno ed., Daniel Donno trans.,
Bantam Books 1981) (1513).
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ROBERT W. MCELROY, MORALITY AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY: THE ROLE OF ETHICS IN
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See infra Part II.D.2.
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III. THE IMMORAL STATE
Having discussed the leading theories of morality, let us return to
modern corporate tax inversions, to see how our inversion laws fare.
Corporate inversions affect both the U.S. and their host country. A 2002
Treasury report “identified three main concerns about corporate inversions:
erosion of the U.S. tax base, a cost advantage for foreign-controlled firms,
and a reduction in perceived fairness of the tax system.” 124 In this section,
these and other concerns will be discussed.
A. Financial Cost
Corporate inversions cost the U.S. billions of dollars annually.125 As
Tyler Dumler points out, even though the U.S. Treasury has lost billions of
dollars to inversions, it is “still responsible for generating adequate revenue
to fund the government budget.”126 According to Dumler, this amalgam of
loss and persisting need results in a greater tax burden for individuals and
domestic businesses.127 Hale E. Sheppard agrees, writing “the number of
corporations that are paying taxes in the United States decreases as the
frequency of inversions increases, thereby making the remaining U.S.
taxpayers responsible for a larger portion of the government budget.”128
According to the U.S. Treasury, President Obama’s plan to eliminate
inversions will raise $17 billion over the next ten years.129
And what if U.S. corporations choose not to ever repatriate foreign
income? Many never do, and current estimates are that about $1.7 trillion
in foreign earnings of U.S. corporations remain abroad.130 That is $1.7
trillion untaxed in the U.S. and not used in the U.S. market. Or, think of it
MARPLES & GRAVELLE, supra note 7, at 1–2.
See, e.g., House Democrats Introduce Legislation to Tighten Restrictions on Corporate Tax
Inversions, DEMOCRATS WAYS AND MEANS COMM. (May 20, 2014), http://democrats.ways
andmeans.house.gov/press-release/house-democrats-introduce-legislation-tighten-restrictions-corporate
-tax-inversions
[http://web.archive.org/web/20160610180552/http://democrats.waysandmeans.house
.gov/press-release/house-democrats-introduce-legislation-tighten-restrictions-corporate-tax-inversions]
(last visited Feb. 21, 2016) (“There have been more than 40 corporate inversions in the last decade,
costing the U.S. tax base billions of dollars.”) [hereinafter House Democrats]; Dumler, supra note 60,
at 89.
126
Dumler, supra note 60, at 92.
127
Id.
128
Fight or Flight, supra note 10, at 563.
129
See Vanessa Houlder, Vincent Boland, & James Politi, Tax Avoidance: The Irish Inversion,
FIN.
TIMES
(Apr.
29,
2014),
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/d9b4fd34-ca3f-11e3-8a3100144feabdc0.html#axzz3O6XUIRrj [https://perma.cc/3HZ4-CJNX] (“In March, President Obama
announced plans to slam the door on inversions by the end of this year, a move the U.S Treasury said
would raise $17 billion over the coming decade.”).
130
See Joshua Simpson, Analyzing Corporate Inversions and Proposed Changes to the
Repatriation Rule, 68 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 673, 680–81 (2013) (discussing how the repatriation
rule has failed and possible legislative solutions).
124
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as a $1.7 trillion tax deficit that must be made up by someone.
B. Effects on Host Countries
Ireland, in particular, does not want to be perceived as a tax haven.131
With an already low corporate tax rate of 12.5 percent, Ireland offered a
zero percent tax rate for transfers of intellectual property from one Irishregistered subsidiary to another.132 As of October 2014, Ireland is
attempting to close that loophole by requiring all Irish-registered
companies to become tax residents in Ireland within the next six years.133
While this will require a corporation to do more than just register in
Ireland, it still leaves open a huge opportunity for tax benefit for U.S.
intellectual property companies that invert. In fact, it seems that Ireland has
benefitted from U.S. corporations inverting:
[Pharma] employs less than two percent of Ireland’s
workforce, yet data published by the U.S. Commerce
Department suggests that Ireland generated profits in 2011 of
$21.8 billion for U.S. chemical and pharma companies. That
is third of all foreign profits for U.S. companies in the sector,
and about forty percent of all Irish corporate profits. U.S.
pharma companies paid a tax rate of less than six percent on
over $100 billion of Irish profits over the last decade,
according to an FT analysis. It showed that the Irish
subsidiaries of U.S. chemical companies have cut their tax
rates far below the statutory rate, from an average of eight
percent in the seven years to 2004 to 4.5 percent in the
following seven years.134
However, consider that the EU recently found fault with Irish tax
policy with regard to at least one large company: Apple. The corporation
has a long history with Ireland.135 In 1990, an Apple tax adviser said that
Apple was the “largest employer in the Cork area with 1,000 employees
and 500 persons engaged on a sub-contract basis.”136 The European
See Houlder, Boland, & Politi, supra note 129 (stating that Ireland insists it is not a tax haven).
Joe Harpaz, Will Irish Tax Law Change Stop Corporate Inversions?, FORBES (Oct. 15, 2014),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/joeharpaz/2014/10/15/will-irish-tax-law-change-stop-corporateinversions/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2016) [https://perma.cc/6L9K-PZCR].
133
See id. (discussing the closing of the “Double Irish” tax loophole).
134
Houlder, Boland, & Politi, supra note 129.
135
See Poornima Gupta & Padraic Halpan, Apple Has Been Dodging Taxes in Ireland for More
Than 32 Years, BUS. INSIDER (May 26, 2013), http://www.businessinsider.com/apple-avoiding-taxesin-ireland-2013-5 [https://perma.cc/LHM4-5XBM] (“Apple has operated almost tax-free in Ireland
since 1980, welcomed by a government keen to bring jobs to what was then one of Europe's poorest
countries, former company executives and Irish officials have said.”).
136
European Commission Says Apple’s Irish Tax Deals Constituted State Aid, RTE NEWS (Oct. 1,
2014), http://www.rte.ie/news/2014/0930/648865-ireland-tax-apple/ [https://perma.cc/S7J2-ZAU7].
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Commission accused Irish officials of “giving Apple unlawful state aid
masquerad[ing] as tax breaks.”137 The U.S. Senate seemed to agree, given
that a Senate investigative panel used Apple’s relationship with Ireland as a
“case study” when looking into “how American companies dodged taxes
by shifting profits offshore.”138 Senators Levin and McCain claimed that
Apple’s tax planning helped the corporation to avoid $44 billion over the
course of four years.139
According to the European Commission, “aggressive tax planning . . .
erodes the tax base of Member States, which are already financially
constrained.”140 Professor Kleinbard, of the University of Southern
California’s Gould School of Law, writes, “The light bulb has gone off that
trade wars by another name and conducted through the tax system are just
as ruinous.”141
C. Other Costs
Avi-Yonah claims, “when a corporation engages in aggressive tax
planning . . . it is breaching an implicit bargain with the state that created it,
gave it legal rights, and created the conditions for it to make those same
profits it is attempting to shield from tax.”142 Building on his argument that
corporate inversions force a shifting of the tax burden onto domestic
businesses, Dumler argues that such a burden could cause domestic
corporations to hire less workers or pay lower wages.143 Shifting the
burden onto individuals could have entirely different sorts of
consequences. “Respected bar associations have . . . argu[ed] that corporate
inversions not only impair the integrity of the voluntary compliance
system, but also violate the spirit, if not the letter of the law.”144
The IRS depends on voluntary compliance to raise revenue. The U.S.
has a voluntary compliance rate of over eighty percent.145 But what if
individuals and small-business owners were to witness large corporations
with rich CEOs paying less in taxes, while their own tax burdens increase?
137
Patricia Cohen & James Kanter, Europeans Accuse Ireland of Giving Apple Illegal Tax Break,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2014, at B01.
138
Id.
139
Robert W. Wood, Forget Inversions, These 20 Huge, Profitable Companies, Already Pay Zero
Tax, FORBES (Aug. 15, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/robertwood/2014/08/15/forget-inversionsthese-20-huge-profitable-companies-already-pay-zero-tax/ [https://perma.cc/3K3G-J33V].
140
Press Release, Eur. Comm’n, State Aid: Comm’n Investigates Transfer Pricing Arrangements
on Corp. Taxation of Apple (Ireland) Starbucks (Netherlands) and Fiat Finance and Trade
(Luxembourg) (June 11, 2014).
141
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Taxation, supra note 29, at 20.
143
Dumler, supra note 60, at 99.
144
Fight or Flight, supra note 10, at 565.
145
IRS, IRS STRATEGIC PLAN, 2009–2013 (2008), http://www.irs.gov/pub/newsroom/long_term_
measures.pdf [https://perma.cc/5F4H-ZSBV].
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According to Dumler, the allowance of corporate inversions causes the
public to “perceive[] the U.S. tax system as operating unfairly by allowing
corporations to escape taxation, while requiring individuals to pick up the
slack, thereby corroding the legitimacy of the governmental tax system.”146
Less voluntary compliance will only magnify the problem.
In one article, the writers claim other likely costs: employees seeing
jobs shifted to foreign countries, increased fear of job loss, negative
company image, barriers to long term survival of the company, difficulty
for the U.S. government to provide necessary services, and political
stresses in the new host country.147 These predictions don’t seem too far off
when taking into account that, “many U.S. multinationals have shifted
research, manufacturing, and regional headquarters overseas, resulting in
600 U.S. companies employing 100,000 people in Ireland alone.”148 The
most recent data shows that unemployment in the U.S. is at about 4.9
percent.149
D. Utilitarian Evaluation
Have corporate inversion laws—particularly Section 7874—affected
the overall level of happiness? Inversions have cost the U.S. billions of
dollars, leaving an extra burden on individual taxpayers and small business
owners.150 While this may have conferred some benefit on the Irish
economy, inversions have hurt the U.S.151 And while corporations often
claim their reason for inverting relates to their fiduciary duty owed to
shareholders, sometimes shareholders end up losing money in the
transaction.152 For example, “the inversion forces the U.S. stockholders to
‘recognize’ gain . . . based on the difference between the fair market value
of the shares of the new foreign parent that they receive and the adjusted
basis that they had in the stock of the former domestic parent . . . that they
surrendered in the exchange.”153
Shareholders may end up with more concerns than the immediate gain
or loss of stock value. “[O]nce the parent of the multinational corporate
Dumler, supra note 60, at 92.
See Ethics of Inversion, supra note 9, at 4–5 (discussing potential consequences).
148
Simpson, supra note 130, at 683.
149
Databases, Tables & Calculators by Subject, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T. OF
LABOR (Feb. 19, 2016), http://data.bls.gov/timeseries/LNS14000000 [https://perma.cc/GPS2-GL8U].
150
See Fight or Flight, supra note 10, at 563 (“[T]he number of corporations that are paying taxes
in the United States decreases as the frequency of inversions increases, thereby making the remaining
U.S. taxpayers responsible for a larger portion of the government budget. . . . [T]he U.S. Treasury
estimates that these transactions are costing the country ‘billions’ of dollars annually.”).
151
See supra Part III.
152
See Laura Saunders, How to Ease the Tax Hit from an “Inversion”, WALL ST. J., Aug. 2, 2014,
at B1 (discussing ways that shareholders lose out in inversions).
153
Fight or Flight, supra note 10, at 557.
146
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group is established in a tax-haven country . . . the laws of that jurisdiction
then govern the rights and obligations of the corporation.”154 This means
that shareholders are not protected by U.S. law. Further, “unsophisticated
or naïve shareholders” might not realize that an inversion is more than just
a “technical maneuver with only tax implications.”155 Given these facts, it
would be difficult to determine that Section 7874 passes muster under a
utilitarian measure of morality.
E. Deontological Evaluation
Lawmakers’ motivations seem to be good in theory—fairness,
equality, and protecting the tax base are all admirable goals. But stating
one thing and then doing another raises questions about true motivations.
For instance, lobbyists can influence lawmakers’ decisions.156 And, since
the McDermott inversion in 1983, only a handful of piecemeal laws against
inversions have come about.157 As discussed, supra, at least Section 163(j)
does not even do what it was intended to do.158 Such a lofty goal as
“fairness” is reminiscent of the “War on Drugs” or the “War on Terror,”
which may sound admirable, but can never truly be won.159 Perhaps goals
such as “fairness” or “equality” are merely politicians’ smoke and mirrors
way of attempting to keep a tax base, which already disapproves of the
IRS,160 relatively compliant with the tax law.
However, our laws appear to pass more easily under a
deontological theory than under a utilitarian one. According to the
literature accompanying laws and proposed laws, the motivation is moral.
Although the outcomes have not been nearly as positive as the intentions,
possibly, legislators’ intentions are good, even if their actions are not.
Id. at 566
Id.
156
See Annie Linskey, Lott Joins Lobbying Push to Keep Up Corporate Inversions, BLOOMBERG
(Aug. 9, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-08-08/companies-bulk-lobbying-as-obamaseeks-to-curb-inversions.html [https://perma.cc/GUV9-KZSL] (discussing “lobbying effort by
companies that want to preserve the option of reducing their corporate taxes by moving their legal
addresses overseas.”).
157
See supra Part II.C.
158
Id.
159
For example, some have argued that the “War on Terror” is a way for politicians to make sure
our country is always at war, gaining patriotism, soldiers, oil, and access to our privacy. See, e.g., Seth
C. Lewis & Stephen D. Reese, What is the War on Terror? Framing Through the Eyes of Journalists,
86 J&MC QUARTERLY 85, 86 (2009), https://journalism.utexas.edu/sites/journalism.utexas.edu/
files/attachments/reese/what-is-war-terror-framing-lewis-reese.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3BY9-4U9Y]
(discussing the longevity of the “War on Terror,” and the fact that such a war has no “delineated . . .
clear enemy nor battlefield”); Anup Shah, War on Terror, GLOBAL ISSUES (Oct. 7, 2013),
http://www.globalissues.org/issue/245/war-on-terror [https://perma.cc/33Z8-PG3N] (discussing the
loose definition of “terror” in the “war on terror” and social costs that have come with the war).
160
See Jones & Saad, supra note 2 (describing the public’s low approval rating of the IRS).
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IV. MORAL LAWS WILL AID IN FIXING THE CORPORATE TAX AVOIDANCE
ACHIEVED THROUGH INVERSIONS
What is the importance of an inquisition into the morality of laws?
Well, focusing on utilitarianism and deontology forces legislators to
evaluate their decisions both from a personal standpoint and from a more
objective and future-looking standpoint. Legislators seem to agree, at least,
that something needs to be done about corporate inversions. Their
motivations for change inform the direction corporate inversion laws
should go.
A. Motivations
Motivation for proposed changes to corporate inversion law appears to
center around equality. According to Representative Danny Davis, the Stop
Corporate Inversions Act of 2014 is “about fairness.”161 Representative
Davis said, “At its heart, it says that America should not have two sets of
rules: one for ordinary folks and one for those with armies of lawyers who
can skirt and bend the law to avoid paying their fair share of taxes. This is
a notion so fundamental to our democracy it seems it should be selfevident.”162 Representative Davis’s comments echo the familiar notions of
equality so fundamental to our nation, which have been spoken and written
about since Thomas Jefferson wrote, in the Declaration of Independence,
“We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal . . .
.”163 Admirable in theory, sure, but despite our oft-quoted core belief in
equality, our nation’s history contains numerous examples of the constant
struggle between those who would like equal rights, and those who seek to
deny them.164
Representative Davis isn’t the only politician spouting fairness and
equality rhetoric. Representative Jan Schakowsky pointed out that
corporations reap the benefits of “tax-payer funded research, our
transportation infrastructure, our top-rate education system and productive
employees it produces, and our world-leading economy.”165 She claims that
these same corporations “have used inversions to avoid their fair share of
U.S. taxes—taxes that pay for the investments that have helped them profit
and thrive.”166 Representative Rosa DeLauro’s sentiments resemble
Representative Schakowsky’s: “[w]e can’t continue to stand by idly while
House Democrats, supra note 125.
Id.
163
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para 2. (1776).
164
For example, civil rights for women, minorities, and homosexuals have only come after long
battles (many of which are ongoing).
165
House Democrats, supra note 125.
166
Id.
161
162
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companies avoid taxes at the expense of everyone else.”
Lawmakers say they want to stop corporate inversions in order to
lessen unfairness, or inequality toward other taxpayers. But according to
the Department of the Treasury, fairness to individual and small business
taxpayers isn’t the only concern. The Treasury Department’s explanations
of revenue proposals contains two other motivations for change. First,
“[i]nversion transactions raise significant policy concerns because they
facilitate the erosion of the U.S. tax base through deductible payments by
the remaining U.S. members of the multinational group to the non-U.S.
members and through aggressive transfer pricing for transactions between
such U.S. and non-U.S. members.”168 Again, the erosion of the U.S. tax
base plays a forefront role in motivating change. Second, “[t]here is no
policy reason to permit a domestic entity to engage in an inversion
transaction when its owners retain a controlling interest in the resulting
entity, only minimal operational changes are expected, and there is
significant potential for substantial erosion of the U.S. tax base.”169 That
leaves a positive and a negative reason: (1) allowing inversions erodes the
U.S. tax base and (2) there is no policy reason to allow them.
While there exists ample commentary from lawmakers on why
corporate inversion law needs to be changed, little exists on why they have
chosen certain solutions over others. U.S. lawmakers must change the way
they look at consequences and motivations in order to create a moral body
of laws.
167

B. Current Proposals for Change
The following are proposed changes to corporate inversion law. Note
the piecemeal nature of these proposals, and how none truly address the
problem.
1. Stop Corporate Inversions Act of 2015 (S. 198 and H.R. 415)
Boasting projected estimated savings of $34 billion in tax revenue,170
the Stop Corporate Inversions Act171 (SCIA) would amend section 7874.
There are three main provisions of the act: (1) SCIA would require
shareholders of the foreign corporation to own at least fifty percent of the
Id.
DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, GEN. EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMIN.’S FISCAL YEAR 2015
REVENUE PROPOSALS 64 (2014), http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/
General-Explanations-FY2015.pdf (last visited Feb. 21, 2016) [https://perma.cc/NR8V-K54B].
169
Id. at 64–65.
170
DEMOCRATS WAYS AND MEANS COMMITTEE, H.R. 415: Stop Corporate Inversions Act of
2015, http://democrats.waysandmeans.house.gov/bill/hr-415-stop-corporate-inversions-act-2015 [http://
web.archive.org/web/20150420022119/http://democrats.waysandmeans.house.gov/bill/hr-415-stop-cor
porate-inversions-act-2015].
171
H.R. Res. 415, 114th Cong. (2015); S. Res. 198, 114th Cong. (2015).
167
168
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new, combined corporation (up from twenty percent previously); (2)
even if fifty percent is owned by shareholders of the foreign corporation,
inversion is still prohibited “if the affiliated group that includes the
combined foreign corporation is managed and controlled in the United
States and engages in significant domestic business activities in the United
States;”173 and (3) SCIA would repeal the sixty to eighty percent ownership
test.174 The bill was originally introduced on May 8, 2014, and would
therefore apply to all inversions completed after that date.175
SCIA comes after an administrative proposal to curb corporate
inversions, since more than forty inversions have occurred since Section
7874 was enacted in 2004.176
172

2. No Federal Contracts for Corporate Deserters Act of 2015 (H.R.
1809)
Simply put, the No Federal Contracts for Corporate Deserters Act
(NFCCD) would deny federal contracts to corporations that have
inverted.177 Detractors argue that the NFCCD would deter competition and
put U.S. jobs at risk.178 These same detractors, however, argue that
legislators must incentivize corporations to stay in the U.S. by lowering the
corporate tax rate.179 But competing with tax rates as low as 12.5 percent
(as in Ireland) is unreasonable because it would require cutting the current
U.S. tax rate by nearly two thirds.180
3. Proposed and Failed
In 2014, aside from SCIA and NFCCD, Congress also proposed the
Corporate Inverters Earnings Stripping Reform Act (CIESRA, S. 2786)181
and the Pay What You Owe Before You Go Act (PWOBGA, S. 2895 and
172
Sens. Durbin and Reed, Reps. Levin and Doggett Introduce Legislation to Curb Corporate Tax
Inversions, DEMOCRATS WAYS AND MEANS COMMITTEE, http://democrats.waysandmeans.house.gov/
press-release/sens-durbin-and-reed-reps-levin-and-doggett-introduce-legislation-curb-corporate-tax#
[http://web.archive.org/web/20151128104814/http://democrats.waysandmeans.house.gov/press-release/
sens-durbin-and-reed-reps-levin-and-doggett-introduce-legislation-curb-corporate-tax].
173
Id.
174
Id.
175
Id.
176
Id.
177
H.R. 1809, 114th Cong. (2015).
178
Letter in Opposition to “No Federal Contracts for Corporate Deserters Act” to the Members of
the United States Congress, (Sept. 8, 2014) (https://www.uschamber.com/letter/letter-opposition-nofederal-contracts-corporate-deserters-act) [https://perma.cc/4RC2-XWPL].
179
Id.
180
Chad Stone, Reality Check on Corporate Taxes, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., (Nov. 13, 2015,
12:00
PM),
http://www.usnews.com/opinion/economic-intelligence/2015/11/13/reality-check-oncorporate-income-tax-rates [https://perma.cc/6RD6-M3U2] (noting that, although the U.S. corporate
tax rate is thirty-five percent, with other factors included, it is actually closer to forty percent).
181
S. Res. 2786, 113th Cong. (2014).
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H.R. 5549). Unlike SCIA and NFCCD, neither of these were renewed in
2015.
CIESRA contains two main provisions: (1) it “[a]mends the Internal
Revenue Code to impose limitations on the tax deduction for interest paid
by corporations which are designated as applicable entities (i.e., members
of an expanded affiliated group which includes a surrogate foreign
corporation which is not treated as a domestic corporation)” and (2) it
“[p]rohibits such an entity from claiming a tax deduction for interest that
exceeds 25% of its adjusted taxable income and from carrying forward
interest which is paid or accrued during the first year in which such entity
becomes an applicable entity.”183 The goal of CIESRA was to curb interest
stripping transactions.184
PWOGBA “[a]mends the [IRC] to require the recapture in subpart F
income . . . the accumulated deferred foreign income of such
corporation . . . for its last taxable year.”185 In other words, the U.S. would
recapture foreign undistributed earnings over U.S. undistributed earnings
which were not tax deferred.186 The purpose was “to include in income the
unrepatriated earnings of groups that include an inverted corporation.”187
182

C. Moral Proposals
According to a 2002 Treasury Report, fairness, equality, and protection
of the U.S. tax base are the three most important goals.188 Lawmakers
should apply major theories of morality in order to write moral laws with
greater ease. They should ask four questions in determining whether a law
is morally sound: (1) Will this law create the greatest amount of happiness
for the greatest amount of people?; (2) Will that happiness be sustainable?;
(3) Are our motivations themselves moral?; and (4) Will this law
contribute to a greater body of moral laws? In the following subsections, I
will evaluate proposals for change while keeping these questions in mind.
1. Incentivize Corporations to Remain in the U.S.
Most of the enacted and proposed legislation has worked (or proposed
S. Res. 2895, 113th Cong. (2014); H. Res. 5549, 113th Cong. (2014).
Corporate Inverters Earnings Stripping Reform Act of 2014, CONGRESS.GOV,
https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/senate-bill/2786 [https://www.congress.gov/bill/113thcongress/senate-bill/2786] (last visited Feb. 21, 2016).
184
Id.
185
Pay What You Owe Before You Go Act, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/113thcongress/senate-bill/2895 (last visited Feb. 21, 2016) [https://perma.cc/ARS2-JQ9D].
186
Id.
187
S. 2895 (113th): Pay What You Owe Before You Go Act, GOVTRACK.US,
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/s2895 (last visited Feb. 21, 2016) [https://perma.cc/6YLGFUXN].
188
See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
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to work) to penalize corporations that try to invert. It is worth considering,
however, the possibility that offering corporations incentives not to invert
might contribute to greater productivity and efficiency. Passing legislation
that reduces the burden of individual taxpayers and small businesses while
also providing incentives to corporations, if effective, would further
utilitarian ends.
Lawmakers should first look at “underlying conditions [that] lead[] to
expatriation.”189 Such a goal might begin with revising and restructuring
the piecemeal laws currently in place. Piecemeal laws, like trying to put out
a large fire with cups of water, lack effectiveness. As soon as one of these
laws is passed, multi-national corporations find work-arounds. For
example, despite Section 7874, these corporations continue eroding the
U.S. tax revenue base through methods such as: “income trapping using
indefinite deferrals of active income in foreign countries; repatriation of
excessive foreign tax credits; [and] avoidance of taxation on holding
companies . . . .”190 Right now, corporate inversion law looks much like a
game of “Whack-a-Mole.” When one mole is bopped, another pops its
head up. This system’s inherent inadequacy won’t be fixed with more
piecemeal laws.
One of the most often suggested incentives, naturally, is to lower the
corporate tax rate.191 To be sure, the U.S. does have a high corporate tax
rate compared to other industrialized nations.192 But lowering the corporate
tax rate to be competitive with popular inversion nations would create a
slew of other problems. Most importantly, it would lead to greater after-tax
income inequality.193 Further, in 2013 corporate taxes brought in $275
billion in revenue.194 Cutting or severely reducing the corporate tax rate
would leave a huge deficit to be made up by someone. This is to say that a
small corporate tax rate decrease would necessarily hurt individuals and
small businesses. While an in depth study of the exact reduction in the
corporate tax rate that could be beneficial is beyond the scope of this note,
see Figure 1195 for a measure of other industrialized nations’ current rates
Dumler, supra note 60, at 89.
Id. at 95.
191
See, e.g., Charles Krauthammer, Lower Corporate Tax Rates. Now., WASH. POST (Aug. 29,
2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/charles-krauthammer-obama-should-take-the-leadin-lowering-corporate-tax-rates/2014/08/28/19319dba-2ee9-11e4-bb9b-997ae96fad33_story.html?utm_
term=.9c1d9db84bb8 [https://perma.cc/CF8R-J7UN] (arguing that liberals and conservatives should
agree that lowering the corporate tax rate will solve the problem).
192
See infra Figure 1.
193
Jared Bernstein, Cutting the Corporate Tax Would Make Other Problems Grow, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 25, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/26/upshot/cutting-the-corporate-tax-would-growother-problems.html [https://perma.cc/2C73-KGM9].
194
Id.
195
The data used in this graph can be found at TRADING ECONOMICS,
http://www.tradingeconomics.com, by searching for each particular country.
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and past high and low rates (in percentages). Note that many of these
countries are currently at or near their lowest rates ever. In fact, the United
States is the only country shown on the graph that has remained at about
the same rate over time.
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2. Enact the Stop Corporate Inversions Act
Though part of the ongoing piecemeal legislative acts, enacting SCIA
will make corporate inversions much more difficult than they currently are.
The combination of lowering the corporate tax rate to lessen the motivation
to invert and making inversions more difficult (and possibly more
expensive for the corporation) should minimize the number of companies
that invert. SCIA works to beef up the important, but only semi-effective,
Section 7874 and should not (yet) be abandoned.
The IRS continues to utilize Section 7874 as a tool to increase
restrictions on inversions. In December of 2015, the IRS issued a notice
(the Notice) laying out additional regulations to cut down on inversions
structured to avoid the governance of Section 7874.196 There are a couple
of updates provided in this notice, two of which I will outline, as they are
the main substantive updates to the 7874 regulations. It will be helpful to
lay these out in order to show how the IRS tries to catch up with inversions
schemes.
First, the Notice addresses inversion schemes that take advantage of
196

IRS Notice 2015-79, 2015-49 I.R.B. 775.
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the substantial business activity exception by utilizing third countries,
generally tax havens, to avoid taxes.197 In other words, a foreign
corporation will acquire the U.S. corporation (together called the
“expanded affiliated group,” or “EAG”) and the EAG will have substantial
business activity in the foreign country, but the foreign acquiring
corporation will have achieved tax residency in a tax haven country. Under
the new regulations, the EAG “cannot have substantial business activities
in the relevant foreign country when compared to the EAG’s total business
activities unless the foreign acquiring corporation is subject to tax as a
resident of the relevant foreign country.”198
Second, the Notice further addresses third country schemes describing
such transactions as ones in which, “the stock or assets of the existing
foreign corporation are acquired by the new third-country parent, and the
shareholders of the existing foreign corporation receive more than 20
percent of the stock of the new third-country parent.”199 Such set ups
“erode the U.S. tax base.”200 Further, the IRS and Department of the
Treasury have discovered that, in these scenarios, “the likelihood that there
is a sufficient non-tax business purpose for replacing the U.S. parent with a
foreign parent is significantly lower than Congress assumed when it
established the 80-percent threshold.”201 The regulations will now
disregard such stock when determining whether the eighty percent
threshold has been met.202
The Notice clarifies the definitions of important topics such as
avoidance property and inversion gain income.203 The effectiveness of
these changes remains to be seen, but the very BandAid-like nature sparks
doubt. In any event, 7874 remains the IRS’s greatest tool against
inversions, so SCIA should be enacted to give 7874 more power.
3. Regulations that Provide Guidance for Corporations Wishing to
Move Abroad
IRC § 367204 provides an example of how we might structure laws in
the best interest of the greatest number of people. Section 367 governs the
transfers of property from the United States to a foreign corporation.205
Under this section, the IRS can stop a transfer from receiving

Id.
Id. at 776.
199
Id.
200
Id. at 777.
201
Id.
202
Id. The Notice dictates four requirements for the regulation to apply. Id.
203
Id. at 778–80.
204
26 U.S.C. § 367 (2012).
205
26 U.S.C. § 367(a)1.
197
198
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nonrecognition status under IRC § 351.
The regulations provide
guidance on which transfers Section 367 should apply to.207 A similar
system could work well for corporate inversions.
Some corporations have important, non-tax-related reasons for moving
to a different country. For example, some corporations are owned primarily
by U.S. shareholders, but do the majority of their business in another
country. These transfers should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.
Regulations could provide further guidance on what constitutes residency.
A discretionary law like this would be more workable than a large change,
such as lowering or getting rid of the corporate tax, or changing the U.S. to
a territorial system of taxation. Rather than hurting small businesses and
individuals by lowering the corporate tax rate, we could simply evaluate
each corporation’s status based on its own situation. And changing the U.S.
to a territorial rather than a worldwide system of taxation would not work
as well as my proposal for two reasons: nations with territorial systems still
face a corporate inversion problem and the U.S. already gives foreign tax
credits to corporations.
206

4. Change the Definition of Corporate Residence
Another workable solution would be to change how corporate
residence is defined. This solution would supplement the previously
proposed solution. If corporate residents included corporations with U.S.
management, only corporations that are truly foreign corporations would
benefit. This would also complement current corporate tax inversion
statutes like 7874. Again, the regulations could be left to provide precise
guidelines.
5. Include IP in Subpart F
Finally, Subpart F should be broadened to include income from CFCs
holding U.S.-generated patents or other intellectual property. This would
help to counteract the benefit of Ireland offering a zero percent tax rate on
IP transfers,208 and other exploitation that has followed.209
Limiting the IP benefits of inverting, re-defining corporate residence,
and allowing exceptions on a case-by-case basis would make it much more
difficult for corporations to invert, while allowing for genuine foreign
corporations to operate in their country of business. As it is, corporations
take advantage of allowances in the IRC. By definition they cannot be held
26 U.S.C. § 351 (2012); 26 U.S.C. § 367(a)1.
26 C.F.R. § 1.367(a)–(b).
208
Harpaz, supra note 132.
209
Simpson, supra note 130, at 683 (“Corporations may also use agreements that share the cost of
intellectual property research and development between the foreign parent and the U.S. subsidiary, and
that provide the foreign parent with rights to exploit the intellectual property abroad and the U.S.
subsidiary with rights to use the intellectual property in the United States.”).
206
207
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accountable for moral decisions, as they exist solely for the benefit of
shareholders. It is only natural (and good business) to take advantage of
legal tax loopholes. In order to take the burden of corporate tax avoidance
off small businesses and individual taxpayers, we must change the
fundamentals of inversion laws.
V. CONCLUSION
Numerous commentators have remarked upon the measure of a
corporation’s morality when it inverts. In light of cases such as Hobby
Lobby210 and Citizen’s United,211 it is not surprising that some attribute
morality to corporations. But this note argues that assessing a corporation’s
morality and admonishing it for acting in a perceived immoral way is
fruitless because corporations are meant to act for their shareholders—not
for the greater good. Instead, we should examine the laws that permit
corporations to act against the best interest of the nation, as these laws are
passed by representatives elected by the people to act in their interest.
Though the question of whether state actors can act morally may not be
resolved, I argue that we must assume that they can. Certainly a better case
can be made for measuring the morality of state actors than corporations.
The State holds the power to set strict rules by which corporations must
abide.
When writing new laws, legislators should keep four main questions in
mind, with the goal of answering each in the affirmative: (1) Will this law
create the greatest amount of happiness for the greatest amount of people?;
(2) Will that happiness be sustainable?; (3) Are our motivations themselves
moral?; and (4) Will this law contribute to a greater body of moral laws?
I believe that, in answering these questions in the affirmative, there are
five ways in which we can lessen the occurrence of corporate tax
inversions. First, we should examine incentives for corporations to remain
in the States while keeping the interests of small businesses and individual
taxpayers at the forefront. Second, in order to buff up current anti-inversion
legislation, SCIA should be passed. Third, issue regulations in the spirit of
Section 367 that will provide better guidelines for corporations that wish to
move abroad. Fourth, change the definition of corporate residence to
include corporations with U.S. management. Finally, include IP in Subpart
F.
These are workable solutions that mostly avoid the traditional
piecemeal laws. Instead of always being one step behind corporations,
210
See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 2751, 2775 (2014) (finding that for-profit
corporations have the right to religious freedom).
211
See Citizens United v. Federal Elections Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 349 (2010) (finding that
corporations’ political speech is protected under the First Amendment).
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legislators should rework the very definitions that permit corporations to
invert. Legislators must also understand that the moral impetus to lessen
the tax burden on small businesses and individuals is theirs alone. We
cannot rely on corporations to do anything other than what is in the best
interest of shareholders. For this reason, legislators must take on the
responsibility.

